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Barrage (military science)

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Barrage is a military term covering a wide range of structures, devices, or measures for destroying something to constrain or impede the movement of troops and forces.

Military barrages may be set up on land, in the water, or in the air to damage enemy forces, to impede their movement, to delay or restrain their actions, or to force them to move in a favorable direction for friendly troops.[1][2][3][4]

Barrages can be erected both in advance and during combat; they can be created in the support zone, on the approaches to defensive lines, in front of their front edge and in the depth of tactical and operational defense zones. Construction of barrages is subject to the intended plan of the battle (operation) and is closely coordinated with the fire system and strikes of the means of fire, taking into account the maneuvering of their forces.[1][3][4]

For all barrages reporting documentation is drawn up in the prescribed form; during the change of troops the erected barrages are handed over by act with the reporting documents attached to it.[1]

History

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It is established that various types of non-explosive barriers were used for military purposes at the dawn of human civilization. As a rule, they included earthen ramparts, stone walls, wooden palisades, ditches, wolf pits, forest barriers and abatis, abatis lines and others.[1][2][3][4] For example, in the defensive constructions of Kievan Rus' the height of earthen shafts reached 19.7–26.2 feet (6–8 meters) and 52.5–55.8 (16–17 meters) in width. In the system of fortifications of ancient Novgorod in 12th century there were two lines of barrages at once.[2] To defend the state borders, powerful systems of fortifications (abatis lines), combining fortifications and barrages, were arranged.[2]

Beginning in the 18th century, propellant (fougasse) began to be used in the construction of obstacles, and from the second half of the 19th century – high explosives.[1][3][4] In 1769 at Khotyn Russian mine-sinkers for the first time used floating mine-explosive means.[2] A little later, in 1776 similar devices were used during the American Revolutionary War.[2] Alexander Suvorov's troops achieved high skill, using barriers against the Turks at Girsov and on the approaches to Kherson in 1787.[2] Mikhail Kutuzov used the construction of barriers in the Battle of Borodino and in the Battle of Tarutino in 1812.[2] During the siege of Sevastopol in 1854–1855 Russian sappers first used galvanic and percussion-fire mines, as well as – shell and stone fougasses.[2][4] During the Russo-Turkish War in 1877–1878 Russian military engineers continued to develop the practice of using stone fougasses and mine underwater barrages.[2] In 1848 they developed the then advanced designs of guided antipersonnel mines and fougasses; in 1894 Russian designers created the first non-recoverable antipersonnel mine, and around the same time the Sushinsky shrapnel shell fougasse appeared.[2]

In 1904 during the siege of Port Arthur Russian troops were the first to use anti-personnel mines and explosive charges remotely initiated electrically.[1][2][3][4] As a rule, in those days, the front lines of Russian explosive barrages consisted of self-acting mines, about 656 feet 2 inches (200 meters) behind them were exposed fougasses controlled by wire.[2] It was also the first time in the world when electric wire barrages were used in combat situations: Lieutenant N. V. Krotkov (1875–1942) proposed to install the so-called electric fences – smooth wire fixed on wooden stakes with porcelain insulators through which high voltage electric current was passed. During an assault on Mount High on a position equipped by them on the night of Nov. 26, 1904 on the wire killed by Russian data, up to 150 Japanese soldiers.[5]

During World War I the first designs of anti-tank mines were immediately developed as armored weapons and vehicles appeared on the battlefield.[1][3] The tactic of creating continuous strips of wire barriers became widespread; on the Eastern front, in addition to them, antipersonnel mines and object delayed-action mines were especially widely used.[1] To strengthen the fortresses (Ivangorod, Osowiec, Brest-Litovsk, Novogeorgievsk, etc.) water barrages in the form of flooding and swamping of the area were used.[2] Long water barrages were also created on the tributaries of the Pripyat River.[2] In 1916, to protect London, Venice and Paris, anti-aircraft barrages were organized with the help of aerostats.[4] During the war Russian military engineers – Dragomirov, Gritskevich, Revensky – proposed a number of original designs of various mines, which were used in barrage systems of different purposes.[4]

In the 1920s and 1930s an intensive development of a coherent theoretical basis for the use of barrages on the scale of battle or operation began in Soviet Union.[1][3] Soviet military theorists Mikhail Vorobyov and Dmitry Karbyshev made a significant contribution to its development.[1][2]

Before the World War II the construction of complex barrage systems was given great importance and as part of the construction of various defensive lines (e.g. Siegfried Line in Germany, Maginot Line in France, Mannerheim Line in Finland) combined barrage systems were prepared, in which along with minefields used metal and reinforced concrete Dragon's teeths, granite tetrahedrons, anti-tank ditches, scarps and counterscarps, etc.[1][2][3][4]

The experience of World War II greatly enriched the practice of barrage systems, which on land were used in all types of combat operations.[1][3] In addition, barriers were actively used in the organization of air defense and coastal defense systems.[1] On mines, which were widely used by the Soviet partisans, the Nazi troops and their allies suffered huge losses[2] (see article Soviet partisans). During the Battle of Moscow the Soviets first resorted to the tactic of mobile mining, which was later successfully used many times to counteract Wehrmacht armored wedges.[1][3][4] Since 1943 Soviet mobile barrage units officially became an element of combat order and operational structure of troops. Air barriers were used in the air defense systems of Leningrad, Moscow and other industrial centers.[1]

In the post-war period the functional role of barrages in combined arms combat and operations continued to increase.[1][3] The theoretical basis for the use of military barrages was improved under the influence of the rapid development of means to overcome obstacles and barrages.[1][3] In armed forces of a number of states on the armament were adopted complexes of remote mining the terrain and water areas by means of aviation technology, rocket arms, artillery and multiple rocket launchers.[1][3] Since the 1980s the tendency to combine remotely installed mine barrages with complexes of reconnaissance-signaling sensors has been revealed.[1]

Classification

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Barrage systems are commonly classified in a number of different ways.[1] Some types of barrages can be false, in which case they tend to mimic combat barrages and are used in conjunction with real ones.[1]

By scale of application[1]:

  • Tactical, which are created by troops and engineer units attached to them in the divisional defense zone according to the plans of formations; they include anti-tank and anti-personnel minefields, non-explosive barriers, nodes of tactical barriers, artificial structures prepared for destruction and sections of transport routes; the build-up and strengthening of tactical barriers can be carried out by mobile barrage squads (MBS);
  • Operational, which are erected according to the plan of the command of the front or army to ensure the fulfillment of tasks in the most important directions, determining the stability of the defense as a whole; as a rule, they include road barrages on major highways (circuitous and frontal), transport hubs, stripes and areas of barrage, mine lines, flood zones and important objects prepared for destruction; operational obstacles are created by the engineering forces of the front or army, in some cases involving forces of division; Operational barrages are created by the engineering armies of the front or the army, in some cases involving the forces of divisions, their increase can be organized by MBSs and reserves of the army, the front or the main command in the theater, as well as – by remote mining the area by air and artillery.

By location[1][2][3]:

By nature of impact[1][2][3]:

  • Explosive (mine-explosive, nuclear-explosive, etc.);
  • Electrified (high tension wire, mesh, or cable barrages);
  • Non-explosive made of improvised and construction materials (earth, wood, snow, concrete, metal, etc.) or of industrially produced structural elements (barbed wire, bollards, anti-tank hedgehog , nets, etc.);
  • Combined (various combinations of explosive, non-explosive and electrified).

By purpose[1]:

  • Cut-offs are created in the defense zones of troops to slow or stop the enemy offensive or to force him to change direction of movement,
  • Disturbing are created without a scheme and, as a rule, in a closed way to restrain enemy actions, slow down his pace of movement and stop him from using certain territories in his interests,
  • Security mines are created without a scheme in an open way from a limited number of anti-tank mines for the purpose of direct protection of troops to strengthen the terrain in front of their positions and between them.

Characteristics

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Each individual barrage on the ground is characterized by its depth, length and time of delay of the enemy in overcoming it. Mine-explosive obstacles are in addition characterized by the number of mines laid and the probability of hitting enemy manpower and equipment on them.[1] Another important parameter is the density of roadblocks, which is determined by the degree to which the terrain is saturated with roadblocks and they cover positions, lines, directions and belts of operations of the troops. The density of barricades is defined as the ratio of the total length of barricades set up to the front width of the line, line or direction to be covered.[1] The densities of non-explosive and explosive mine obstacles, as well as the densities of anti-tank and anti-personnel mine obstacles, are determined separately.[1]

The combat effectiveness of an erected system of barrages is assessed by the number of defeated enemy manpower and equipment at mine-blast barriers, as well as by reducing the rate of his offensive through the use of all types of barriers in the aggregate. It is believed that the maximum efficiency is achieved by suddenness, massiveness and echelon of obstacles on the directions of enemy troops.[1]

Barrages can be set up in the first and second degrees of readiness; the degree of readiness of barrages and the procedure for their transfer from one state to another is determined by the commander of the regiment or division on whose section they are set up.[1]

  • First degree – full operational readiness: in minefields, guided mines are placed in the combat position, unguided mines are finally set and equipped, warning signs and fencing from minefields are removed, demolition charges, object and anti-vehicle mines are set and camouflaged, detonators are inserted in charges, and their mechanisms are initiated; in combined barriers the set mine explosive elements are equipped and detonated, passages and passages through them are mined.
  • Second degree of readiness: anti-vehicle and object mines are set and camouflaged, but their fuses have not been placed in the firing position, demolition stations are fully equipped, explosive charges in the objects to be destroyed are prepared for their rapid placement in the firing position, their charges and explosive nets are set, detonators are connected to explosive nets, but not inserted in the charges, unguided mines in minefields are equipped and set, but the fields themselves are fenced and guarded, guided mines are kept in a safe condition; non-explosive barriers are prepared, but the passages and passages through them are not destroyed or mined.
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Notes

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  1. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z aa ab ac ad Грачёв, П.С. (1995). Заграждения. Военная энциклопедия. Vol. 3. Moscow, Russia: Voenizdat. pp. 203–207. ISBN 5-203-00748-9.
  2. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t Введенский, Б. А., ed. (1952). Заграждения военные. Большая Советская Энциклопедия [Great Soviet Encyclopedia]. Vol. 16 (2nd ed.). Moscow, Russia. pp. 305–306.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
  3. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o Заграждения. Советская военная энциклопедия. Vol. 3. Moscow, Russia: Voenizdat. 1979. pp. 361–362.
  4. ^ a b c d e f g h i j Прохоров, А.М., ed. (1972). Заграждения военные. Большая Советская Энциклопедия [Great Soviet Encyclopedia]. Vol. 9 (3rd ed.). p. 624.
  5. ^ Груздев В. Б. Электрические заграждения. История применения. // Военно-исторический журнал. — 2021. — № 10. — С.77—78.

Bibliography

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  • Варенышев Б. В. Будущему воину об инженерном деле. — М.: ДОСААФ, 1972.
  • Гутенко П. Д., Матин Г. А. Минное оружие. — М., 1988. — 95 с.
  • Карбышев Д. М. Раздел 3. Инженерные заграждения // Избранные научные труды. — М., 1962. — 704 с.
  • Колибернов Е. С., Корнев В. И., Сосков А. А. Справочник офицера инженерных войск / Под ред. С. Х. Аганова. — М. : Воениздат, 1989. — С. 248–332. — 432 с. : ил. — ББК 68.516. — ISBN 5-203-00133-2.
  • Самойлов Р., Опилат В. Заграждения на водных преградах по взглядам специалистов НАТО (рус.) // Зарубежное военное обозрение : журнал. — 1977. — No. 4. — С. 94–98. — ISSN 0134-921X.
  • Сидоров В. Применение инженерных заграждений в армейских оборонительных операциях // Военно-исторический журнал : журнал. — September 1979. (т. 239, No. 09). — С. 69.
  • Суша В. А. Шеховцев Н. П. Сетевой способ построения инженерных заграждений (рус.) // Армейский сборник : журнал. — May 2014. (т. 239, No. 5). — С. 19–23.
  • Geneste, Marc E. Barbed Wire and Boomerangs. // Military Review. — February 1963. — Vol. 43 – No. 2.
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