Battle of Gagra (1919)

Battle of Gagra (1919)
Part of Sochi conflict
Georgian People's Guard and its commander Valiko Jugheli (far right) in Gagra
Date April 16–19, 1919 Location Gagra district Status Georgian victory
Belligerents
Democratic Republic of Georgia	South Russia
Commanders and leaders
Valiko Jugheli Giorgi Gedevanashvili †	Anton Denikin
Units involved
Regular Army People's Guard	Armed Forces of South Russia
Casualties and losses
Minor casualties	87-500 dead

The Battle of Gagra was fought on April 16–19, 1919, between the Democratic Republic of Georgia and the White Army. The battle resulted in a Georgian victory.

Background

The relations between the Georgian Democratic Republic and the White movement were complicated. The White forces were negatively predisposed towards the Menshevik government of Georgia due to its separatism from Russian Empire, socialism and pro-German orientation before Germany's defeat in the First World War. Menshevik government of Georgia, on the other hand, did not sympathize with the aims of White forces. Although the cooperation against Bolsheviks seemed probable in the summer of 1918, the negotiations between the sides in Ekaterinodar in September 1918 led to disagreement and straining of the relations. One of the point of contentions was who should occupy the district of Sochi. Gagra, a town on Black Sea shores, was transferred to the Sochi district in 1904 by the Russian Tsarist authorities.

After the Allies' victory in the First World War, the Caucasus region came under the British sphere of influence due to the British-French treaty of December 1917. Both the Whites and the Georgians welcomed the arrival of British forces in the region. Anton Denikin, a supporter of the Allies and the White Army, hoped that Britain would support the vision of a "united and indivisible Russia." However, Georgia hoped for the British support, citing the Harold Wilson's principle of self-determination.

The Britain's primary aim was to maintain the status quo in the region until Russia's future was decided at the Paris Peace Conference. Britain's priority at this stage was to unite anti-Bolshevik forces against Bolshevism. The Britain provided material and diplomatic support to the Volunteer Army and sent a representative to its center in Ekaterinodar (Krasnodar). However, it also supported the newly-formed Caucaucasian states. The representatives sent to the respective governments often came to identify with the interests of the government to whom they were accredited. Because of this, the policy of the British seemed two-faced to Denikin. The Britain's policy was contradictory as it lacked the central direction, the Britain had faulty communications, and also the representatives to the White movement and Georgia became partisans of the respective governments: British representatives to Ekaterinodar General Poole and General Briggs supported the claims of White movement, while the representatives in Tbilisi supported Georgian claims. The British contradictory policies ultimately alienated both sides.

In December 1918, Denikin capitalized on the Armeno-Georgian War by seizing, without any resistance, some of the disputed territory in the Sochi district that was previously occupied by Georgia. However, Britain continued to support the status quo and dictated that Denikin should not make any further advances to the Georgian-controlled territories in the south. Denikin was displeased that Britain was "disposing of Russian territory" without his consent and felt that the British were turning a blind eye to Georgia's recent alliance with Germany. He decided to ignore Britain's demands and proceeded to cross the Loo River on February 6, 1919. Denikin was able to capture the entire Sochi district in four days, pushing Georgia back to the Bzyb River. Gagra was also captured by the White forces.

Denikin believed that Britain had sided with the Georgians and never forgave them for this perceived offense. Meanwhile, Georgia blamed Britain for allowing the Russians to attack. As a result, British authority was undermined on both sides of the conflict. Although the parties understood that Britain desired to maintain the status quo, it became clear that Britain would not take action to restore it by force. The White Army and the People's Guard of Georgia faced each other on the Bzyb River, while Britain placed its garrison along the riverbank to separate the sides.

On April 9, 1919, General George Milne, the commander of the British Expeditionary Force, notified Denikin that they requested Georgia to move its troops down the Bzyb River line. However, due to Britain's inaction and the weakening of its authority by this time, Milne's requests carried little weight.

Georgian Foreign Minister Evgeni Gegechkori tried to lobby to the British forces the Georgian offensive to retake Sochi district for Georgia. According to a report of the meeting of the Georgian People's Guard, Gegechkori was notified that the British asked Denikin to withdraw his forces, although in no avail. Gegechkori reported that the Britain's attitude towards Denikin worsened, and they diminished their supplies to the White forces. The Field Staff of the People's Guard demanded the offensive, although it was not supported by the Georgian government, which thought that the operation would not improve the situation and even the successful offensive would bring only insignificant results. The Main Stuff of the People's Guard voted against offensive on 11 April.

After capturing the Sochi district, the White Guards immediately began efforts to restore the "pre-revolutionary order." This included returning lands to their previous owners; carrying out several mobilizations; organizing requisitions of goods, fodder, and transports; and conducting punitive operations and White Terror. In response, a partisan movement developed as local peasants in the Sochi district formed green armies. On April 12, 1919, a group of 1,500 White Army soldiers carried out punitive operations against the local populations of Sochi and Adler. This, along with the inaction of the Britain, served as the direct trigger for the Georgian offensive. Georgia reacted by mobilizing the regular army, eight battalions of the People's Guard, Colonel Giorgi Khimshiashvili's Cavalry Division, and Colonel Kargareteli's 4th Artillery Battery on the Bzyb River. Meanwhile, the Main Stuff of the Georgian People's Guard issued a call supporting the "comrades from Sochi".

Georgian forces decided to launch an offensive operation in the direction of the Mekhadir River in the Gagra region. Georgian Foreign Minister Evgeni Gegechkori sent a letter regarding the operation to General William Thomson, a new representative of the British Expeditionary Force. Upon General Thomson's advice, Gegechkor also sent letters to General Milne. General Thomson responded to the letter by saying the British command ordered the Georgian forces not to advance without British approval, and warned about "grave consequences". He also said that Denikin was given an ultimatum to withdraw within 48 hours, and in case of his refusal, Georgians would be given freedom of action. As Denikin had not withdrawn, Gegechkori sent a telegram to General Milne: "You know that the Sochi front has a three-month history. During this time, we expected that the issue would be resolved through diplomacy. We have repeatedly received such a promise from the English government. This long wait had an unbearable psychological effect on the units of our army stationed on the front line. Further inactivity would be equal to disaster. ...The Georgian government expresses its hope that the British High Command will evaluate our move as a forced act of self-defense, which is not against the Georgian government's loyalty to Great Britain". Georgian General Aleksandr Gedevanishvili gave last ultimatum to Denikin. Without waiting of the reaction of Britain, the Georgian government gave the order to retake Gagra region.

Battle

On April 16, 1919, the People's Guard and regular Georgian Army units launched an attack against the White Army on the Bzyb River. The attack involved infantry, artillery, and cavalry units. To increase maneuvering space, the Georgians had earlier constructed a new bridge on the upper reaches of the Bzyb River. On April 17, around 1:00 PM, Giorgi Lomtadze's Third Battalion captured Gagra for the first time, suffering no losses and capturing 500 prisoners. On April 18, around 9:00 AM, the People's Guard crossed the Mekhadiri River, and the White Army retreated near the village of Vesioloe. On April 19, Georgian units reached the Mzymta River and approached Adler. As the Georgian forces attacked, a Green Army peasant rebellion also broke out in Sochi and Adler, behind the White Army's lines. The Green Army and Georgian units coordinated their assault, ultimately forcing the White Army to retreat.

However, British sentiment toward Georgia soured. Before Georgian forces launched the second phase of their operation, both General Thomson and General Milne protested. General Thomson determined the Georgia's operation to be a "hostile move" towards Britain. The robbery and murder of a British captain and doctor in Tiflis had their own negative effect on the relations with Britain; furthermore, in Akhalkalaki, a Georgian soldier shot at the car of British lieutenant colonel Alan MacDougall Ritchie, which General Thomson strongly condemned in an official note, although Ritchie was not injured during the incident. To avoid worsening the situation, Georgian forces halted their advance towards Sochi and Adler, withdrawing to the Psou River. Meanwhile, Denikin prepared troops to launch his own offensive, with the objective of fully capturing Sochi and the Sukhumi district. However, General Charles Briggs, the British representative to Denikin, convinced him that negotiations could result in Georgia agreeing to further withdrawal. According to alternate sources, Denikin may have also called off his offensive because he was unable to mobilize sufficient forces, due to the majority of his troops being engaged on the main front fighting the Bolshevik Red Army.

Negotiations between the governments of Georgia and South Russia began in Tiflis on May 21, 1919. General Briggs and General William Beach, another British military representative to Denikin, participated in these negotiations on behalf of Denikin's government. General Briggs advised Georgia that British forces would soon withdraw from the South Caucasus, and therefore it would be advisable for Georgia to improve relations with Denikin's government. Nevertheless, the negotiations ended inconclusively on May 23, 1919.

On May 24, a second meeting was held between representatives of Georgia's government and Denikin's government. General Beach warned Georgia that Denikin would attack if Georgian forces did not withdraw, but Noe Zhordania responded that if Denikin attacked, Georgia would consider Britain to be responsible as well. Ultimately, Georgia refused to surrender Gagra.

Source

• Kenez, Peter (2021). Civil War in South Russia, 1919-1920. University of California Press. ISBN 9780520327795.
• Chachkhiani, Archil (2015). "1919 Gagra Offensive Operation and Tactical Analysis of Battles". Annals (PDF) (in Georgian). Vol. 11. Tbilisi: Universal.