Deng Maoqi rebellion
The Deng Maoqi rebellion (simplified Chinese: 邓茂七之乱; traditional Chinese: 鄧茂七之亂; pinyin: Dèng Màoqī zhīluàn) was a peasant revolt that took place in 1448–1449 in the Ming dynasty during the reign of Emperor Yingzong. It occurred in the interior of Fujian in southeastern China. The tenants revolted, refusing to make payments to landlords beyond the scope of their leases. The local militia units were unable to suppress the uprising, and the army had to be sent in. In May 1449, the main forces of the rebels were defeated, and the scattered remnants were destroyed. However, peace was not restored until 1452.
In addition to the Deng Maoqi rebellion, there was also an uprising of miners illegally extracting silver in the border regions of Fujian, Zhejiang, and Jiangxi from 1447 to 1449. This uprising was led by Ye Zongliu (葉宗留).
Background
[edit]In 1436, Emperor Yingzong's government converted grain taxes in some southern Chinese provinces into payments in silver, known as "golden flower silver" (金花銀; jinhuayin). In 1438, in response to the increased demand for silver, the government closed down silver mines and banned small-scale silver mining on the border between Zhejiang and Fujian. Those who violated the ban were executed. However, in an overpopulated region with high unemployment rates, many turned to illegal silver mining, leading to the rise of "mining bandits" (kuangzei).[1] To combat this issue, the government organized a local militia in the mid-1440s through the baojia (watches and tithings) system, training able-bodied men from villages to fight and providing them with weapons stored in village armouries.[1]
In 1447, Ye Zongliu, the leader of a group of illegal silver miners in the mountains between Zhejiang and Fujian, openly rebelled against the government. He gathered followers, formed an army, and declared himself king (wang).[2] The rebellion was not quelled until August 1449.[3]
Course of the rebellion
[edit]In the interior of Fujian, the overseers of one of the baojia, Deng Maoqi and Deng Maoba,[1] used their influence to support the tenants in their demands against the landlords. The tenants were demanding the abolition of the "winter gift" (冬牲; dongsheng), an additional fee traditionally imposed on top of leases.[4] In March 1448,[2] the landlords requested the authorities to arrest the brothers, but they resisted and retaliated by killing the county magistrate.[5] Their rebellion was successful, gaining support quickly,[3] and by the end of the summer, they had already gained control of two county towns.[5]
The government attempted to pacify the situation by forgiving unpaid taxes and granting a three-year exemption from the work obligation in the lijia system. However, the more radical faction of the rebels refused to surrender. Both sides, the rebels and the local authorities with the landowners, utilized the baojia organizations to forcibly enlist a significant number of peasants into the army, resulting in disruptions to agricultural work. The rebel army grew to several hundred thousand men[5] and their leader, Deng Maoqi, declared himself king.[a] In the latter half of 1448, the conflict spread throughout Fujian, overwhelming the local militia's ability to handle the insurgents.[3]
The government deployed troops to combat the rebels in September 1448.[3] The decisive force, consisting of over fifty thousand soldiers, gathered in northeastern Jiangxi.[5] They first targeted the rebels led by Ye Zongliu, who had also taken control of the mountains on the border of Fujian and Jiangxi. Jie was killed in December 1448, and the remaining rebels were forced to retreat north to southern Zhejiang. In August 1449, they were ultimately defeated.[3]
In February 1449, the Deng brothers were captured and executed after being betrayed by their fellow soldier.[3] Their cousin then took over leadership of the rebellion, but was also soon betrayed.[5] By May 1449, the government army had successfully defeated the main forces of the rebels. However, it took until 1452 for scattered rebel groups to be eliminated and for peace to be fully restored.[7]
Causes and consequences of defeat
[edit]According to Canadian historian Timothy Brook, the tenants lost the personal relationship with their largely absent landlords, instead viewing their relationship as purely contractual. As a result, they refused to make any payments that were not explicitly stated in their contract.[8] Japanese historian Tanaka Masayoshi argues that the rebels made a mistake by trying to negotiate with the government, which had no interest in protecting the people from local elites. However, Tanaka also notes that this was the first Chinese peasant uprising that was not motivated by officials' corruption, but rather by class relations.[8] Despite the scale of their rebellion, the rebels did not receive widespread support. The local gentry remained loyal to the government, and the general population was satisfied with the promise of exemption from compulsory labor for three years. Even the miners, who had been heavily oppressed, were content with a reduction in compulsory levies and the abolition of death penalties for stealing silver.[7]
The successful suppression of Deng Maoqi's rebellion and other mining revolts, as well as victorious campaigns against the Shan states on the southwestern borders in the 1440s, may have led Emperor Yingzong to overestimate the strength of his troops. This overconfidence led him to personally lead the army in a campaign against the Mongols in 1449, which ultimately resulted in the Ming defeat at Tumu and the capture of the emperor.[9]
Notes
[edit]References
[edit]Citations
[edit]- ^ a b c Brook (1998), pp. 81–83.
- ^ a b Twitchett & Grimm (1988), p. 312.
- ^ a b c d e f g Twitchett & Grimm (1988), p. 313.
- ^ Brook (1998), p. 83.
- ^ a b c d e Brook (1998), pp. 84–85.
- ^ Brook (1998), p. 84.
- ^ a b Twitchett & Grimm (1988), p. 314.
- ^ a b Brook (1998), p. 85.
- ^ Goodrich & Fang (1976), p. 290.
Works cited
[edit]- Brook, Timothy (1998). The Confusions of Pleasure: Commerce and Culture in Ming China. Berkeley: University of California Press. ISBN 0-520-22154-0.
- Twitchett, Denis C; Grimm, Tilemann (1988). "The Cheng-t'ung, Ching-t'ai, and T'ien-shun reigns, 1436—1464". In Mote, Frederick W.; Twitchett, Denis C (eds.). The Cambridge History of China Volume 7: The Ming Dynasty, 1368–1644, Part 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 305–342. ISBN 0521243327.
- Goodrich, L. Carington; Fang, Chaoying (1976). Dictionary of Ming Biography, 1368-1644. New York: Columbia University Press. ISBN 0-231-03801-1.